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Governance, Competence, and Firm Boundaries: 





Answering to the recent call for theoretical integration of transactions costs economies and 
resource-based view, we examine how a boundary change affects the pre-existing organizational 
routines in terms of organizational knowledge and truce simultaneously can further contribute to our 
literature. We focus on the connections between boundar y choice decisions and the broader 
organizational design issues. We posit that anticipation of the difficulty to conduct post-acquisition 
integration might moderate transactions costs economies prediction on vertical integration. Moreover, 
our integrative model could also explain acquiring firms’ decisions to conduct post-acquisition 
integration or to leave the acquired firms as standalone subunits, thereby shedding more light on the 
theoretical linkages between firm boundaries and intermediate and hybrid governance forms.  This 
study contributes to the management literature by further exploring the deeply intertwined interactions 
between governance and competence. Our theoretical framework provides a more comprehensive 
model that explains and predicts how a firm accesses external resources and how its decision would 
affect its firm boundary.
Keywords: transactions costs economics, resource-based view, incentive regime
Introduction
Williamson (1999) observes that theories within the strategic management field can be categorized 
into governance-based and competence-based theories1）. Whereas governance-based theories from the 
organizational economics tradition address firm boundary choice, alliance structure, employee contract 
1）　Governance-based theories include transaction costs economics, agency theor y, and proper ty right theor y. 
Competence-based theories include resource-based view, knowledge-based view, and organizational and dynamic 
capabilities. 
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structure, and other important firm governance issues (Argyres, 2011), competence-based theories are 
ultimately concerned with explaining heterogeneous firm performance, which is the research question 
many strategy scholars believe should be the central issue of the field (ibid.). 
Recently, some within the strategy field have started to call for theoretical integration of these two 
approaches. In particular, Foss and Foss (2004) submit that transaction costs economics could advance 
the resource-based view (RBV) literature by providing potential remedies to a number of weaknesses, 
such as RBV’s inattention to the interaction between value creation and value appropriation. Relatedly, 
through a set of carefully constructed analytical models, Makadok (2003) shows that mitigating agency 
problem and improving the accuracy of managers’ expectations of the future value of resources are 
complementary in reducing the problem of underinvestment. Therefore, Makadok (2003) maintains 
that future research on the genesis of competitive advantage should examine agency and governance 
issues along with, not apart from, competence-based issues. More recently, Argyres and Zenger (2010) 
go beyond Makadok’s (2003) observation on complementarity between governance and competence 
and suggest that transaction costs and capabilities considerations are in fact so intertwined dynamically 
that treating them as independent and competitive explanations of firms’ boundary choices is 
fundamentally misleading. Argyres (2011) further maintains that organizational economics can shed 
light on how firm capabilities are developed and sustained, and calls for examining the complex 
interactions between economic and noneconomic considerations. 
In this paper, we aim to further explore the complex interactions by focusing on the important 
strategic issue of firms’ boundary choices, which is traditionally addressed by explanations based on 
transaction costs logic. The basis of this dominant explanation is that those transactions that are 
vulnerable to costly opportunism should be internalized into focal firm’s boundary (Williamson, 1975; 
1985). However, in recent years, an emerging stream of research maintains that firms’ boundary 
choices should be better understood as the outcome of the tension between the need to access external 
resources and the need to control the transactional hazards that entail (Yang, Lin, & Lin, 2010). Since 
the need to access external resources is driven by the logic of comparative capabilities, it was argued 
that factors from organizational economics and organizational capabilities considerations are 
fundamentally intertwined and a more nuanced theory of firms’ boundary choices calls for an 
integrative framework (Argyres & Zenger, 2010; Qian, Agarwal, & Hoetker, 2011). 
We aim to extend this research stream by adopting an explicitly organizational perspective, which 
maintains that firms’ boundary choices can be more usefully understood as embedded within the 
broader managerial concerns of effectively and efficiently organizing collective productive activities. 
Moreover, our explicitly organizational perspective enables us to unpack the theoretical construct of 
organizational capability, and explicitly recognizes the its collective nature. Organizational capability is a 
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collective-level construct distinct from individual-level capability in that organizational capability 
encapsulates within it design considerations that account for the need to both coordinate and motivate a 
group of interacting individuals toward the collective objectives. Hence, we emphasize that 
organizational capability is the ability to successfully orchestrate certain team production (Alchian & 
Demsetz, 1972), which requires both competence and governance considerations2）. Thus, consistent 
with Kaplan and Henderson’s (2005) research that seeks to bridge organizational economics and 
organizational theor y, we put for th a definition of organizational capabilities that recognizes 
organizational capabilities are as much about “what should be done” (i.e., possessing the technical 
knowledge of how to collectively achieve organizational objectives) as they are about “what should be 
rewarded” (i.e., having appropriate incentive regime in place to induce individual team members toward 
collective actions). Importantly, since boundary change would likely expose the original organizational 
capabilities to disruptions on how individual members are motivated, transactions that involve 
transferring organizational capabilities might fundamentally alter the nature of the assets being 
transacted.  Taken together, we maintain that a firm’s boundary decision not only needs to jointly 
consider comparative capabilities3） and potential transactional costs (Argyres & Zenger, 2010), when the 
external asset being acquired consists of collective-level capabilities, the acquiring firm also needs to 
consider how the targeted asset might be fundamentally altered by bringing them into the focal firm’s 
boundary.
This study aims to contribute to the management literature by further exploring the deeply 
intertwined interactions between governance and competence. Our theoretical framework incorporates 
organizational economics and organizational capabilities to provide a more comprehensive model that 
explains and predicts how a firm accesses external resources. We present our discussion in three parts. 
2）　Alchian and Demsetz (1972) discuss how metering problems associated with potential shirking can be mitigated 
through various organizational arrangements. We interpret this observation as effective governance is a necessary 
condition for team production. Since organizational capability by nature involves team production, we maintain that the 
successful creation of organizational capability requires effective governance choice within the organization. This type of 
governance considerations is intra-organizational and focuses on agency issues. The governance considerations in the 
transaction costs literature is typically inter-organizational and focuses on transaction specific investments. Even though 
these two types of governance considerations operate at distinct levels of analysis, we maintain that firms’ boundary 
choices have significant impacts on both. Thus, when the asset being transacted is a bundle of organizational capabilities, 
treating the asset as a conceptual black box runs the risk of neglecting the impact on governance considerations at the 
agency level. 
3）　We note that Argyres and Zenger’s (2010) conceptualization of comparative capabilities is dif ferent from simple 
assessment of the “inherent” value of the capability considered in isolation. Instead, they emphasize that the value of a 
target asset should be assessed by how uniquely complementary it is with the firm’s existing bundle of assets. Thus, the 
same asset is likely to have dif ferent values to dif ferent firms. We recognize and agree fully with their distinct 
conceptualization, even though we choose to apply the same label of comparative capabilities.  
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In the first part, we discuss the importance of adopting an explicitly organizational perspective when 
constructing organizational theories. In particular, we discuss how a “black box” approach that reifies 
collective-level constructs might create important theoretical blind spots that assume away important 
nuances. In the subsequent part of the paper, we discuss how a “black box” approach to the theory of 
organizational capabilities exposes our theories to the risks of reification. We then put forth our 
definition that seeks to rectify the problem. In the last part of the paper, we examine the extant theory 
on firms’ boundary choices, and discuss how treating all assets to be transacted as standalone, discrete 
entities fails to account for important managerial concerns. We then put forth a set of propositions to 
illustrate our integrative framework. We conclude with discussion and the implications.
Theorizing at the Organizational Level
We maintain that recent contributions toward theory integration suffer from a significant weakness. 
Organizational capabilities, core competence, or related collective-level constructs are often treated as 
theoretical “black boxes,” bundling routines, individual-level capabilities and competencies, and other 
valuable assets. In other words, organizational capability as a construct is often reified, and the 
distinction between collective capabilities and individual capabilities is consequently deemphasized. 
Zhao and Anand (2009) comment that collective activities are the raison d’etre of organizations, even 
though the collective aspect of organizational phenomena has rarely been explicitly examined. We have 
lost the organizing aspect of organizational capability. Consequently, full integration of theoretical 
models that contain causal mechanism cutting across multiple levels of analysis remains a significant 
challenge. 
Similarly, within the macro organizational theory (OT) literature, some have started to express 
concern that macro OT has begun to parallel the neoclassical theory of the firm, in which the firm is 
“blackboxed” (Gavetti, Levinthal, & Ocasio, 2007). Expressing similar concern for the development of 
the field, Whetten (2004) observes that organizational scholars are rarely explicit about what they mean 
by ‘organizational’ in his Organization and Management Theory Division Distinguished Speaker 
Address presented at the 2004 Academy of Management Conference. Underlying these concerns is the 
recognition that a multilevel approach to organizational research that integrates variables across 
multiple levels of analysis may provide a scientifically valuable theoretical foundation for organizational 
phenomena (Roberts, Hulin, & Rousseau, 1978; Klein, Dansereau, & Hall, 1994; House, Rousseau, & 
Thomas-Hunt, 1995; Morgeson & Hofmann, 1999). 
Interestingly, the rationales given by those OT researchers in favor of a multilevel organizational 
research program share striking similarities with the reasoning provided by those scholars contributing 
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to the emerging theme in strategy research for the search of “microfoundations.” Observing that there 
is a general problem of lack of attention to individuals in strategy literature (Felin & Foss, 2005; Gavetti, 
2005), these scholars maintain that the kind of macro or “collectivist” explanations that currently 
dominate strategic management literature are theoretically incomplete (Abell, Felin, & Foss, 2008). In 
particular, they maintain that there are no mechanisms that operate solely on the macro-level, directly 
connecting macro-antecedents to macro-consequences and that inter-level relations can be causal and 
thus theoretically meaningful (Abell, Felin, & Foss, 2008; 2010). Recognizing the limitations of the 
extant theories on organizational capabilities, we seek to rectify the problems with an explicitly 
organizational perspective. 
Central question of OT. Consistent with Gavetti and coauthors’ (2007) call for restoring 
Carnegie School’s original mission and defining commitment to a decision-centric and hence internal 
view of organizations, this paper assumes the position that one of the central theoretical questions for 
organization theory is how, given boundedly rational actors, the act of organizing produces in the 
aggregate collective outcome that is greater than the sum of all the individual outputs? This question 
underpins much of the discussion from early contributions to organization theory, particularly 
Thompson’s (1967) study on how to organize an organization to meet and handle uncertainty and 
Lawrence and Lorsch’s (1967) discussion on organizational differentiation and integration. 
In their review of the early OT literature, Davis and Marquis (2005) comment that March and 
Simon (1958) provide a superb answer to this central question consistent with the behaviorally plausible 
assumption of bounded rationality. Their 1958 book describes how cognitively limited individuals are 
able to achieve in the aggregate far greater ends through the successive decompositions of an 
organizational task into subtasks that are simple enough “bite-sized” mental chunks that fit individual 
bounded rationality and then through the artful reaggregation of all the individual outputs back into the 
intended collective ends. Similarly, in the review on the organizational routine literature, Mahoney 
comments that “the organizations that Nelson and Winter (1982) envisage are those that face a 
substantial co-ordination problem, typically because these organizations have many members, 
performing many distinct roles, who make complementary contributions to the production of a 
relatively small range of goods and services” (Mahoney, 2005: 192). Thus importantly, an explicit 
consideration of the act of organizing emphasizes organizations as collective entities with numerous 
cross-level coordinating linkages. Therefore, the set of theoretical constructs that does not explicitly 
capture the multilevel coordinating processes in the act of organizing is unlikely to have complete 
explanatory power to fully address the central question identified above. 
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Reification and anthropomorphism. In their theoretical discussion about the structure and 
function of collective constructs in the extant literature, Morgeson and Hofmann (1999) pose a series of 
questions highlighting a number of issues about collective phenomena that they submit have not been 
fully addressed:
Is it justifiable to refer to collectives as if they possess characteristics that are inherently human? 
Do groups and other collective entities possess such things as “abilities,” “personalities,” or 
“memories” (LePine, Hollenbeck, Ilgen, & Hedlund, 1997; Tziner & Eden, 1985; Wash & Ungson, 
1991)? Are organizations able to learn, apart from the learning of individual organizational 
members (Argyris & Schön, 1978; Senge, 1990)? 
Morgeson and Hofmann (1999) comment that by ascribing individual attributes to collective 
entities, organizational scientists risk committing the fallacies of reification and personification (or 
anthropomorphism), which, they maintain, could lead to the proliferation of terms that have little 
scientific value. Consistent with a number of arguments put forth by organizational scholars in favor of a 
multilevel research program (Roberts et al., 1978; Klein et al., 1994; House et al., 1995), Morgeson and 
Haofmann (1999) submit that “integrating variables across multiple levels of analysis may provide a 
more veridical account of organizational phenomena” (1999: 249). Citing House et al. (1995) and the 
ambitious framework of “mesoparadigm” they put forth, they maintain that both micro and macro 
variables are needed in order to understand organizational phenomena. Quoting House and coauthors
social interaction is fundamental to organization-related processes … What is needed is a way of 
coupling theories and research at different levels into a meaningful whole. We need mechanisms that 
help us conceptualize the complex relations between units at different levels of analysis … in organizational 
settings (1995:86, emphasis added).
This explicit emphasis on multilevel interactions provides one possible answer to Whetten’s (2004) 
question of what organizational scholars really mean by ‘organizational.’ To Morgeson and Hofmann, 
‘organizational’ means adopting an explicitly multilevel theoretical perspective that captures the 
complex social interaction and relations between units across different levels of analysis. In other words, 
‘organizational’ means there should be no “blackboxing” of collective constructs that reify or 
anthropormorphise organizational features. However, one could question the extent to which this 
explicitly multilevel perspective is necessary for all organizational theory development. Would a set of 
proposed causal relationships among collective constructs that fully encapsulate their internal 
structures and hence treated as undif ferentiated entities necessarily prevent the overall casual 
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understanding from being ‘organizational?’ In other words, would a set of proposed casual relationships 
among macro-level constructs necessarily fail to contain the essence of ‘organizational’ theorizing. To 
fully reflect on this question, we discuss next various underlying processes of organizational theory 
construction and the associated methods of construct development to clearly reveal the theoretical 
consequences of reification and anthropomorphism. 
Analogies and Metaphors in Theory Construction. Weick (1989) submit that the process 
of theory construction in organizational studies can be portrayed as ‘disciplined imagination.’ In 
particular, Weick (1989) describes various approaches to organizational theory construction using 
Kaplan’s (1964) distinction between knowledge growth by intention and knowledge growth by 
extension. Weick (1989) further comments that this contrast resembles Barlett’s (1958) distinction 
between interpolation and extrapolation, which suggests that there might be two distinct processes of 
theory building. Knowledge growth by intention is used “when a partial explanation of a whole region is 
made more and more adequate,” (Weick, 1989: 517) which resembles the logic of interpolation. On the 
other hand, knowledge growth by extension is used when “a relatively full explanation of a small region 
is then carried over to an explanation of adjoining regions,” (Weick, 1989: 518) which resembles the 
logic of extrapolation. In terms of collective construct development, we can apply Weick’s (1989) 
distinction of knowledge growth to examine how constructs acquire meaning and structure at the 
collective level. 
It is important to note that theoretical constructs are nothing more than hypothetical concepts that 
are not directly observable (MacCorquodale & Meehl, 1948). In other words, constructs are theoretical 
shorthand containing the abstract features needed to explain some observed phenomena. To the extent 
that theories are abstractions of complex reality, the meaning and structure of theoretical constructs 
would reflect the very process of abstraction, or how the theory is built. When a theory construction 
process follows the logic of knowledge growth by intention, the theoretical constructs developed would 
contain rich, detailed features capturing deep meanings and reflecting the rich interrelated structural 
features of the observed phenomena. On the other hand, when a theory construction process follows 
the logic of knowledge growth by extension, the theoretical constructs employed actually originate from 
the said ‘small region’ with the relatively full explanation. Thus, these theoretical constructs are 
‘borrowed’ based on some intuitions or informed decisions to exploit meaningful theoretical similarities 
between the source and target regions. Meanings and structures of the constructs employed are then 
‘extrapolated’ based on the belief that explanations in the source region remain valid in the target 
region. For instance, the theoretical construct of organizational memor y extrapolates our 
understandings of how an individual might recall past experience, and based on our intuition and 
京都マネジメント・レビュー　　第 24号76
informed belief that organizations also recall past experiences in similar fashion, the meaning and 
structure of the construct of individual memory is carried over to the construct of organizational 
memory. 
In other words, theoretical constructs developed following the logic of knowledge growth by 
extension are actually analogies or metaphors that encapsulate the underpinning constitutive processes 
and rely on some observed similarities. This assertion finds no stronger support than the way Nelson 
and Winter’s (1982) conceptualizes their focal theoretical construct of organizational routine. In fact, 
besides providing numerous descriptive definitions that do discuss the underpinning constitutive 
processes or organizational routine, Nelson and Winter (1982) also appeal to readers’ rich and direct 
personal experience with individual skill, and put forth an almost SAT-like analogy that individual is to 
skill as routine is to organization. This analogy works so well that subsequent scholars often rely solely 
on it when adopting the concept of organizational routine, which prompts Gavetti and coauthors (2007) 
to express their concern that our scholarly focus has been moved away from decision making in 
organizations to the semi-automatic routine execution. 
Therefore, the quality of constructs developed in this manner depends largely on how well the 
observed relations between the source and target domain pertain to the theoretical understanding 
being pursued. For instance, if the theory being developed aims to explain how diversity of past 
experience affects organizational responses to future events, constructs developed through analogies or 
metaphors based on analogous individual-level constructs might be sufficiently meaningful to inform 
our understanding of how an organization responds to future events as a standalone entity. Our rich 
understandings of and direct personal experience with the concept of individual memory can be 
meaningfully carried over to an organizational level because the analogy is built on theoretically relevant 
connections between the two domains. On the other hand, if the theory being developed aims to explain 
how an organization is conditioned by dif ferent contextual factors that af fect the accuracy of 
organizational memory to recall past experience, constructs developed through analogies or metaphors 
based on individual-level constructs are less likely to be meaningful. Our rich understandings and direct 
personal experience with individual memory might not find theoretically relevant connections to the 
organizational level. How an individual stores memor y simply dif fers too much from how an 
organization stores memory. 
Therefore, reification or anthropomorphism per se might not be as problematic as Morgeson and 
Hofmann (1999) suggest across all cases of organizational theory building. Matching appropriate 
process of construct development with the intended theoretical objective might be more important. In 
fact, Weick (1989) maintains that our thinking about organizations is often captured in metaphors. 
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Organizations are complex, dynamic, and difficult to observe, which means that whenever we think 
about them, the thinking will be guided by indirect evidence and visualizations of what they may be 
like, often captured in metaphors. That is not to apologize for the materials used in theory building. 
Rather, it emphasizes that theorists depend on pictures maps, and metaphors to grasp the object of 
study. Theorists have no choice, but can be more deliberate in the formation of these images and 
more respectful of representations and efforts to improve them. Metaphors are not just catchy 
phrases designed to dazzle an audience. Instead, they are one of the few tools to create compact 
descriptions of complex phenomena (Weick, 1989: 529).
In summary, we subscribe to the position that whether an explicitly multilevel perspective is 
adopted in the construction of an organizational theory depends largely on what the theory intends to 
explain. In the context of addressing the dif ficulty to fur ther integrate governance-based and 
competence-based theories, we maintain that an explicitly multilevel perspective could play an important 
enabling role. In the sections that follow, we discuss how an emphasis on the act of organizing in 
defining the construct of organizational capabilities could bring more nuanced integration of governance 
and capabilities considerations. 
Organizational Capabilities
Consistent with Felin and Foss’ (2005) observation that extant research in strategic management is 
currently dominated by “collectivist” explanations, the research literature stream on organizational 
capabilities is also converging on an interpretation of capabilities4） as collective entities that directly 
drive organizational performance (Winter, 2003; Felin & Foss, 2005; Gavetti, 2005; Salvato, 2009). 
Salvato (2009) observes that in this literature stream, individual agents are increasingly placed in the 
4）　In fact, the construct of organizational capabilities is so reified that the qualifier ’organizational’ is often dropped from 
usage within the strategy literature. Makadok’s (2003) modeling efforts make no distinction between individual-level and 
collective-level capabilities, completely ignoring potential synergy created by properly coordinating a group of willing and 
capable individuals. The fact that with such a strong set of simplifying assumptions, Makadok (2003) still finds strong 
complementarity between governance and capabilities considerations to call for theoretical integration is remarkable. We 
submit that with the strong simplifying assumptions relaxed, and the emphasis on organizational capabilities’ constitutive 
process of organizing or coordinating individuals introduced into the theoretical construction, governance-based and 
competence-based considerations would not only be strongly complementary, but also in fact theoretically inseparable. 
Following this reasoning, a strong distinction between individual-level and organizational-level capabilities is needed, 
especially in the context of boundary change. We observe that during the transfer of a collective-level asset, governance 
considerations are impacted at both firm level and individual level. Blackboxing organizational capabilities as standalone 
assets prevents the impact on agency level governance from being fully considered. 
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background, and their role in effecting performance advantage is largely ignored. Importantly, this 
“blackboxing” of a collective construct creates a theoretical blind spot on how capabilities might evolve 
due to individual-level processes. This theoretical blind spot manifests itself in numerous instances 
throughout the literature, often when the construct of organizational capabilities is either defined at a 
collective level as “knowledge integration” (Grant, 1996), or defined somewhat circularly as an 
organizational “ability,” (e.g., Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997) “capacity,” (e.g., Helfat et al., 2007) or 
“competence” (e.g., Prahalad & Hamel, 1990).  Even though these various definitions serve their 
respective theoretical purposes well, collectively, the literature stream leaves important questions 
unanswered. 
To address this theoretical blind spot, we prof fer the following definition for organization 
capabilities as an alternative. In particular, we follow Morgeson and Hofmann’s (1999) guidelines for 
multilevel collective constructs such that there is an emphasis on the interaction of organizational 
members and that there is consideration of the constitutive processes through which the collective 
constructs emerge. 
DEFINITION. An organizational capability is a multilevel and cross-functional system of patterned 
interactions among organizational members such that they are both motivated and coordinated to 
apply their individual capabilities and aggregate their individual outputs to reliably attain 
organizational objectives.  
Subsumed within this proposed definition are motivation and coordination considerations, and 
along with them governance-based and competence-based theories respectively. The packaging of 
motivation and coordination considerations in the theoretical construct is not just a definitional 
expedience in order to integrate governance-based and competence-based theories. It has a deeper 
theoretical significance as it recognizes the existential criteria for organizational capability to truly 
emerge. Following Makadok’s (2003) observation that agency considerations and competence 
considerations complement one another in value creation, and added to it an explicitly organizational 
perspective, this paper maintains that the existence of an organizational capability is predicated upon 
both the successful design and execution of an incentive regime to induce organizational members to 
contribute and the needed coordination program to properly decompose organizational task into 
suitable subtasks for individual members and reaggregation of their outputs back into organizational 
ends. This position is consistent with Gavetti and coauthors’ (2007) call for a tighter paradigmatic 
closure among Carnegie School’s central theoretical pillars. In particular, the proposed definition 
specifically integrates Carnegie School’s two central tenets – the role of conflicts of interest and 
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cooperation among organizational members and the role of specialized decision-making structures. 
Similarly, the proposed definition explicitly integrates Nelson and Winter’s (1982) conceptualizations of 
routines as organizational memory and routine as truce. This definition is also consistent with Kaplan 
and Henderson’s (2005) position that cognition and incentive are phenomenologically deeply 
intertwined, despite being analytically distinct concepts.  
Thus, the proposed definition reflects the theoretical position that an explicitly organizational 
perspective on capabilities can only be achieved not only by recognizing the complementarity between 
governance and competence considerations as some strategy scholars recently have called for, these 
two set of considerations are in fact theoretically inseparable. Existing organizational capabilities can be 
lost if either the incentive regime or the coordination program deteriorates and fails to serve its 
constitutive purpose. Thus, successful motivation and coordination are both necessary but not sufficient 
conditions for an organization to attain a capability. As we discuss in later section, this rather self-evident 
observation has important theoretical implication when governance-based and competence-based 
theories are being fully integrated. 
Firm Boundary Choice
In the following section, we outline how an explicitly organizational interpretation on organizational 
capabilities can provide some theoretical leverage to generate more nuanced integration of the two main 
streams of research literatures within strategic management. 
Transaction costs economics (Williamson 1985; 1991; 1996) is one important research stream 
within the governance-based strategic management theories. The central argument for transaction costs 
economics is that firm boundary choice is determined by a transaction costs minimizing logic, which is 
driven by the specificity of assets involved in particular transaction. High asset specificity leads to high 
transactional hazard, which increases the likelihood of vertical integration to mitigate the transactional 
hazard. Williamson (1985) observes that different types of assets can be involved in a transaction (e.g., 
physical assets, human assets, dedicated assets, etc.) but maintains that regardless of asset types, asset 
specificity is the core mechanism that determines the level of transactional hazard, and thus the 
likelihood of a boundary change.  
The problem with the standard theoretical prediction is that Williamson (1985; 1991; 1996) does 
not take into account that different types of assets might differ greatly in their organizing requirements. 
Physical assets are discrete, tangible, and valuable assets, whereas human assets often are bundled in 
an organizational setting. Except the cases that human assets refer to individual professionals working 
mostly in isolation, most human assets have part of their overall value embedded not just in the 
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individual talents but also in how they are organized to perform organizational tasks. Hence, acquisition 
implementation is likely to be problematic when valuable assets reside in organized interactions among 
individuals, increasing the difficulty to managers of the acquiring firm to evaluate and appropriate the 
value of acquired asset (Coff, 1997; 1999; Ranft & Lord, 2002). Consequently, disruption to how 
individual members are motivated or coordinated would fundamentally change the nature of the 
acquired organizational capability. Thus, standard transaction costs theor y’s neglect of the 
organizational nature of certain class of assets might result in biased prediction and hence problematic 
prescription, since moving organizationally embedded assets across firm boundary might alter the 
incentive regime in place in subtle ways that end up fundamentally changing the nature of the overall 
organizational capability (Datta, 1991). As an illustrative example, we apply the proposed definition of 
organizational capability and generate a set of propositions with a more nuanced consideration of how 
governance-based and competence-based theories can be integrated. 
Acquiring External Organizational Capabilities 
Transaction costs economics prescribes vertical integration to acquire external assets when using 
market transaction to access these external assets result in high transaction costs. Acquisition of 
external assets usually allows a firm to obtain valuable resources and capabilities (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; 
Chaudhuri & Tabrizi, 1999; Ranft & Lord, 2002). However, if the external asset sought is a particular 
organizational capability, it might not survive the boundary change (Pablo, 1994; Williamson, 1975). 
Transaction costs rationale suggests that vertical integration solves the incentive alignment problem; 
however, as a governance device to align incentives, vertical integration might also disrupt the existing 
incentive regime that constitutes the organizational capability (Datta, 1991; Wang & Zajac, 2007; Yang et 
al., 2010). In other words, a subtle change in the incentive regime might break the delicate truce in 
intraorganizational conflict (Kaplan & Henderson, 2005; Kapoor & Lim, 2007). We emphasize that the 
governance considerations of transaction costs economics align incentives at the collective level, but the 
boundary change to the target organizational capability might disrupt governance considerations at the 
agency level as well. Thus, the factors in strategic factor market (Barney, 1986) are not always stable 
after the boundary change. In particular, we submit that strategic factors that derive much of their value 
in organizing individuals in unique and complementary manner are particularly problematic in the 
context of boundary chance. 
Extant transaction costs literature addresses this potential concern by calling on management to 
exercise selective intervention (Williamson, 1991) after vertical integration is completed. The 
organizational capability of integrating acquired capabilities is usually more important than the 
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ownership of acquired capability (Chen, Williams, & Agarwal, 2012; Grant, 1996; Ranft & Lord, 2002; 
Qian et al., 2011). Thus, in order to retain stability in the motivational component of organizational 
capability, the managers at the acquiring firm’s decision to engage in post-acquisition integration is 
likely to be critical to post-acquisition performance. An appropriate reward structure can facilitate the 
post acquisition (Dosi, Levinthal, & Marengo, 2003). Although scholars have also noted that 
management does not always refrain from intervention (Williamson, 1996; Foss, 2003), treating 
organizational capability as a conceptual black box that masks the underlying attainment of truce 
further exacerbates management’s tendency to excessively intervene. Thus, post-acquisition integration 
is likely to consume more time without first addressing the uniqueness of acquired firm's asset (Cui, 
Calantone, & Friffith, 2011).  A set of propositions is put forth. 
Proposition 1: The wider the gap between the pre-existing incentive regimes of the acquiring and 
acquired firms, more time would elapse before the acquiring firm engages in post-acquisition 
integration. 
After acquisition, the acquiring firm may often impose its incentive regime on the acquired firm 
(Datta, 1991), without considering whether the pre-existing incentive regime provides a suitable 
mechanism to motivate individuals from the acquired firm to manage capabilities (Pablo, 1994). King et 
al. (2004) submit that incentive regimes are rare at the center of discussion when scholars identify 
antecedents that impede post-acquisition performance. As a matter of fact, individuals at the acquired 
firm are likely to undermine the acquisition implementation plan when their incentives greatly differ 
from managers' at the acquiring firm (Parvinen & Tikkanen, 2007). By the same token, the post-
acquisition performance is likely to be lower when acquired and acquiring firms lack of common 
coordinating mechanisms (Kapoor & Lim, 2007; Meyer & Lieb-Doczy, 2003) 
Proposition 2: The wider the gap between the pre-existing incentive regimes of the acquiring and 
acquired firms, the more post-acquisition integration is associated with a reduced performance.
Moreover, conceptualizing organizational capability with an explicit consideration of the act of 
organizing could also bring more nuanced transaction costs prediction. Instead of focusing exclusively 
on asset specificity, managers also need to consider how vertical integration might reduce the value of 
the acquired organizational capability. Especially, managers become aware that incomplete or 
inappropriate post acquisition integration may inhibit firm performance (Meyer & Lieb-Doczy, 2003). 
Even though the pre-existing coordination program might be relatively obvious and easier to retain, the 
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pre-existing incentive regime that helps achieve the needed organizational truce might be difficult to 
assess and protect. Kaplan and Henson (2005) highlight problems that an acquiring firm may encounter 
from developing a new incentive system. Without understanding that the acquisition positions them to a 
new market, individuals at the acquired firm may not sense the necessity of accepting the new incentive 
system. Also, individual at the acquiring firms may regard the new incentive system as a violation of the 
existing employment contract. The managers at the acquiring firm are likely to have difficulty managing 
the original part of the firm. Thus, individuals at acquired and acquiring firms are likely to be reluctant 
to accept and new incentive system because they lack full knowledge of the new system's effectiveness. 
The interfirm differences with respect to the incentive system are likely to help determine its firm 
boundary decision (Schilling & Steensma, 2002; Yang et la., 2010). The gap between the pre-existing 
incentive regimes of the two firms would thus negatively moderate the transaction costs prediction to 
vertically integrate as the managers of the acquiring firms consider the potential loss of value and the 
potential cost of integration. This reasoning leads us to the final proposition in the current study. 
Proposition 3: All else being equal, the wider the gap between the pre-existing incentive systems of the 
potential acquiring and potential acquired firms, the less likely vertical integration is pursued. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Organization is a complex, multilevel, and dynamic entity. As organizational scholars, we need to be 
conscious of the way we theorize about organization. Even though an explicitly multilevel perspective 
might not be needed in all cases, when the causal relationships being developed might involve 
disruption to the underlying constitutive processes of the collective constructs, we need to careful with 
the analogies and metaphors we might be subconsciously applying. The previous discussion on the 
organizational capabilities literature suggests that the extant research in this area might have committed 
the fallacy of reification, limiting the potential explanatory power of the theory produced. Bringing an 
explicit consideration of the underlying act of organizing back into the discussion could potentially 
mitigate the theoretical blind spot, as more proximal reasons for heterogeneous firm performance are 
explicitly considered. 
Furthermore, the theoretical position of this paper is consistent with the neo-Carnegie perspective 
(Gavetti et al., 2007) that our field has moved too far from the decision-centric, internal view of 
organization. After all, the act of organizing is a fundamental feature of our civilization. Only through the 
act of organizing can boundedly rational actors achieve in the aggregate far greater ends than the 
simple sum of individual outputs. We submit that act of organizing is not only the engineering problem 
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of finding the right coordination program, or agency problem of finding the most efficient incentive 
structure. Instead, the act of organizing is a complex, multilevel interaction between these two concerns. 
Governance and competence considerations are not just complementary to performance outcome as 
Makadok (2003) demonstrates. They are also not just dynamically intertwined macro-level concerns as 
Argyres and Zenger illustrate (2010). They are in fact theoretically inseparable across both hierarchical 
and temporal dimensions. 
Seeing under this new perspective, firms’ boundary choice decisions are in fact embedded in the 
broader managerial concerns of effectively and efficiently organizing collective actions. Similar to 
Argyres and Zenger, we adopt the model of a manager as one “who tries to orchestrate optimal asset 
and activity matching and crafts governance to both enable and protect the generation of unique 
complementarity” (2010:24). Thus, value creation and value appropriation are not separate managerial 
concerns. They are in fact joint decisions that are deeply intertwined. We add on to their theoretical 
integration with our observation that value appropriation occurs across multiple levels. Managers not 
only have to worry about potential hold-up problems with external sources at the firm level, they also 
have to worry about value appropriation within the firm at the agency level (Coff, 1997; 1999). 
Therefore, an integrative theory on firms’ boundary choice decisions can benefit from not only the 
integration of transaction costs and organizational capabilities literatures, but agency theory and 
managerial cognition at the individual level should also play an important role. More importantly, we 
suggest that the important cross-level interactions might be particularly interesting. After all, managers 
designing firm boundaries are essentially making decisions of an important firm-level attribute, while 
having to worry about how their firm-level decisions would impact the individual-level activities that 
ultimate generate the outputs of the firms. The content of their decision model is unlikely to be linkages 
between macro-antecedents and macro-consequences. Instead, the linkages they are concerned with 
are more likely to be micro-processes to macro-changes. A behaviorally plausible model consistent with 
the Carnegie School tradition should explicitly account for the cross-level linkages. 
Our organizational perspective also sheds light on the connections between boundary choice 
decisions and the broader organizational design issues. In particular, our propositions suggest that 
anticipation of the difficulty to conduct post-acquisition integration might moderate transactions costs 
economics prediction on vertical integration. Moreover, our integrative model could also explain 
acquiring firms’ decisions to conduct post-acquisition integration or to leave the acquired firms as 
standalone subunits, thereby shedding more light on the theoretical linkages between firm boundaries 
and intermediate and hybrid governance forms (Makadok & Coff, 2009). Argyres and Zenger’s (2010) 
integrative framework explains how unique complementarity between Disney and Pixar leads to Disney’
s decision to acquire Pixar, despite of having relatively inferior capability in animation. Our extended 
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framework would further explain Disney’s decision to essentially leave Pixar as a standalone subsidiary, 
agreeing to an explicit list of guidelines for protecting Pixar’s creative culture5） . It is not just the unique 
complementarity with the target capability that acquiring firm’s managers need to be worried about, we 
submit that the potential cost required to preserve that unique complementarity also plays an important 
role in boundary decision. 
Our integrative framework calls for an explicitly organizational perspective because we subscribe 
to the position that an organizational capability is likely to have a cognitive as well as an incentive 
dimension (Kaplan & Henderson, 2005). Unpacking the theoretical blackbox that has dominated extant 
literature could hold the key to exposing more nuanced understanding of firm behaviors. We believe a 
model that examines how a boundary change affects the pre-existing organizational routines in terms of 
organizational knowledge and truce simultaneously can further contribute to our literature. 
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